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CASE COMMENTS
in line with the cases decided under other workmen's compensation
acts.
"[E]very respectable loss-adjusting mechanism must look in two
directions: it must make the injured person whole, and it must also
seek out the true wrongdoer whenever possible." 38 The court in
Murray is concentrating on the latter goal. Yet the result which is
reached does not satisfactorily meet either goal. When this is the
case, the emphasis should be placed on compensation to the injured
employee in accord with the basic principle of recovery in tort. The
resulting loss may fall heavily upon the third party. Nevertheless,
courts should favor the injured plaintiff rather than the negligent
tortfeasor.
RICHARD P. LASKO
COALITION BARGAINING: THE EXPANSION OF
THE BARGAINING UNIT
According to labor, one of its major deficiencies is not being able
to negotiate with equal bargaining strength vis-h-vis multi-plant em-
ployers.1 Therefore, in recent years, labor has considered coalition
bargaining as one of its major goals.2 Coalition bargaining involves
different unions representing different bargaining units3 of the same
3A. LARSON, 2 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 71.10, at 165 (1968).
'When the American Federation of Labor (AFL) merged with the Congress of
Industrial Organization (IO) in 1955, Walter Reuther, head of the CIO, insisted
on the establishment of the Industrial Union Department (IUD) to formulate broad
labor goals. How to deal with the large multi-plant employer has always been one
of the primary concerns of the IUD. Engle, Coordinated Bargaining: A Snare-And
A Delusion, 19 LAB. L.J. 518 (1968).
OUnions feel that coalition gives them a strengthened bargaining position since
an employer no longer runs the risk of having only one of his plants shut down
by strike, but virtually his entire operation. To an employer of size this is a
weighty factor which the unions hope will tip the scales toward more employer con-
cessions. Hildebrand, Coordinated Bargaining: An Economist's Point of View, ig
LAB. L.J. 524 (1968).
'As a matter of clarification, a bargaining unit is a group of employees with the
same needs and interests that has been accepted by the Board as "appropriate" to
be represented by some labor organization for the purposes of collective bargaining.
Generally, the union will set out in their 9(c) petition what group of employees they
wish to represent. The Board will then determine if that group of employees is
an appropriate unit. If they are, the Board holds an election whereby the employees
1969]
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employer negotiating in unison for one common contract for all units
or in the alternative for individual unit contracts, each with identical
terms.4 Its purpose is "to bring multi-plant companies with several
unions into national bargaining on economic items which are national
in scope.... " There is little doubt that any form of coaltion bargain-
ing is permissible when there is a mutual desire to use it.6 However,
when either labor or management tries to force the other to accept
coalition bargaining, its legality is drawn into question.
In a recent case, General Electric Company,7 this issue was raised
when the Company refused to bargain with the bargaining committee
of the International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE)s when the
in this unit are able to designate whether or not they desire the petitioning union
to represent them. If the union receives a majority of the votes cast, they become
the "exclusive bargaining agent" for the bargaining unit. See L. SiLvERBERG, How
To TAKE A CASE BEFORE TnE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONs BOARD 19, 41, 47, 166
(3d ed. K. McGuiness 1967).
'This type of bargaining technique knows several names, including "pattern"
bagaining, "cooperative" bargaining and "coordinated" bargaining. When the
technique is used by management, it is called "multi-employer" bargaining. See
Engle, Coordinated Bargaining: A Snare-and A Delusion, 19 LAB. L.J. 518 (1968);
Comment, The Status of Multiemployer Bargaining Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 1967 DUKE L.J. 558; Anker, Pattern Bargaining, Antitrust Laws and
the National Labor Relations Act, NEW YORK UNivERsrry NINETEENTH ANNUAL CON-
FERENCE ON LABOR 81 (1967).
5W. REUTHER, AGENDA FOR TOnioRRow 51 (1965), as quoted in Petitioner's Brief
on Review From Decision and Order of the National Labor Relation's Board at
46, General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, appeal docketed, No. 32867, 2d Cir., Feb. 28, 1969.
6McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690, 705 (S.D.N.Y.) rev'd, 366 F.2d
847 (2d Cir. 1966), rev'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 533 (1967); Radio Corp. of America,
121 N.L.R.B. 633 (1958); see General Motors Corp., i2o N.L.R.B. 1215 (1958).
7173 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 69 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1968).
"For some time the several independent unions representing the Company
employees had been increasingly concerned about what they considered a weakness
in bargaining separately with the Company. This led to the formation in 1965 of
the Committee on Collective Bargaining (CCB) composed of representatives of
AFL-CIO unions that bargain with GE. Early in 1966, the IUE and the other
seven cooperating unions framed joint bargaining demands to be presented to
GE. By letter the CCB informed GE of their intention to bargain in a coalition.
GE refused to meet with them on the grounds that it represented an illegal attempt
to bargain on a company-wide basis. Thereafter the IUE notified the Company that
it was withdrawing its request to bargain jointly and proposed a meeting date to
which the Company agreed. However, in preparation for that meeting the union
added to its negotiation committee as "nonvoting" members, one representative
from each of the other seven unions, which, with the IUE, had comprised the coali-
tion. The Company had no knowledge that the IUE had augmented its bargaining
committee with the "outsiders" until the actual day of the meeting. On that day
when the GE negotiators noted the presence of the representatives from the other
seven unions, they refused to meet with the committee. The union then filed a
refusal-to-bargain charge with the Board and the Board's General Counsel issued a
complaint. See note ii infra.
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bargaining unit of the UE included not only members of the TUE
but also representatives from the bargaining units of seven other
unions.9 The Company argued that the "outsiders" at the meeting
represented an indirect attempt by the union to bargain in a coalition.
This, said GE, was illegal because such a coalition would have the
effect of unilaterally expanding the bargaining unit without the
proper National Labor Relations Board approval.10 The Board found
that the Company had violated Section 8(a)(5)'l of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (LMRA) which provides that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees. The Board reasoned that the unions
had merely utilized their right under section 7 of the LMRA to select
their own bargaining representatives. 12 To hold otherwise, said the
'The other seven unions were the American Flint and Glass Workers, the Allied
Industrial Workers, the Sheet Metal Workers International Alliance, the American
Federation of Technical Employees, the International Association of Machinists, the
United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers, and the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.
"OGeneral Electric Co., TXR-316-6 7 (1967).
"-Section 8(a)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act provides: "(a) It shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employer-... (5) to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees....2" 9 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964). The
Board's procedure in processing a refusal-to-bargain charge is precisely set out in
the Act. When the charge is received from the complainant, a Board agent is sent
to investigate the merits. He reports his finding to the General Counsel and if the
latter feels that the charge contains sufficient grounds for a complaint, one is
issued. A hearing is then scheduled before a trial examiner where both parties have
the opportunity to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses and generally present
their respective cases. An appeal may then be taken to the five-member National
Labor Relations Board. From there an appeal may be taken to the appropriate
United States Circuit Court of Appeals. See Labor Management Relations Act § io,
29 U.S.C. § 16o (1964).
Under section lo(j) of the Act if there is appropriate need, the General Counsel
may seek an injunction from a United States District Court to enjoin the objec-
tionable conduct until the complaint is heard. The principal case has a long his-
tory as a result of this provision. The General Counsel issued his complaint and
then asked the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
to issue an injunction to compel GE to bargain with the IUE committee. The
District Court issued the injunction. McLeod v. General Electric Co., 257 F.
Supp. 69o (S.D.N.Y. 1966). However its decision was reversed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: McLeod v. General Electric Co., 366 F.2d
847 (2d Cir. 1966). Mr. Justice Harlan stayed the Second Circuit's order pending
action on a writ of certiorari. 87 S.Ct. 5 (1966). The writ was granted, but subse-
quently a contract was executed by GE and the IUE. The Supreme Court then
remanded the case for a determination of whether the issue had been mooted by
the execution of the contract. 385 U.S. 533 (1967).
"-Trhe text of section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
1969]
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Board, would hinder collaboration, cooperation and communication
among unions. Dissenting, Board member Howard Jenkins maintained
that "to allow representatives of other units to attend and participate
in negotiations for a unit which ,they do not represent may have the
effect of broadening or narrowing, at the pleasure of the unions con-
cerned, the numbers, types and locations of the employees covered or
affected by the bargaining. This in turn would conflict with the re-
sponsibility of the Board to determine the scope of the appropriate
unit .... "13
Analytically, General Electric raises some interesting questions
relative to the concept of coalition bargaining. The first falls within
the realm of what is commonly known as true coalition bargaining.
In -true coalition bargaining two or more unions join together and
bargain for a common "master agreement."'14 The object of the unions
is to group together as one so as to be in a position to employ massive
economic force against the employer in order to gain their economic
demands. 15 The question that is presented is whether this technique
can be upheld under current Board regulations. A related question is
whether a true coalition could ever be considered by the Board to be
an appropriate bargaining unit where there is a lack of mutual
consent.
16
A second area of concern deals with what unions commonly call
"coordinated" bargaining.17 Coordinated bargaining is a variation
their own choosing and to engage in other concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
"General Elec. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 69 L.R.R.M. 1305, 1312 (1968).
"A master agreement is a common contract covering all employees represented
by the various unions making up the coalition. The master agreement is the device
through which the coalition acquires its added economic strength. By having a
master agreement all employees are legally able to go on strike at the same time.
See note 2 supra.
"When unions speak of their "economic power" they refer to their effective
ability to apply economic pressure on the employer to the point that the employer
concedes the unions' bargaining demands. Such economic pressure is effected through
the basic device of striking. Obviously, with more employees on strike at the same
time causing a larger percentage of the employer's productive capacity to shut
down, greater economic pressure may be applied by the union. Thus, the idea
underlying true coalition bargaining is to control as many employees as possible in
order to gain added bargaining power at the negotiating table. See Hildebrand,
Coordinated Bargaining: An Economist's Point of View, 19 LAB. L.J. 524 (1968).
"The writer has found no cases precisely on this point.
'-Unions apparenty use this term because to them it indicates a cooperative
endeavor. Also, unions are aware of the legal problems that surround true coalition
bargaining and thus tend to emphasize a distinction through terminology. See
Lasser, Coordinated Bargaining: A Union Point of View, 19 LAB. L.J. 512 (1968).
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from true coalition bargaining in that two or more unions represent-
ing separate bargaining units negotiate jointly for individual unit
contracts containing common terms. This was the technique used in
General Electric. The question is whether this technique should be
permitted by the Board if true coalition bargaining is not.
I
The inherent defect in true coalition bargaining is that the coali-
tion attempts to negotiate for an expanded bargaining unit which has
not been approved by the Board. One of the most important functions
of the Board, under section 9 of the LMRA, is to delineate collective
bargaining units and to certify exclusive bargaining agents's to repre-
sent those units. This arises from the basic policy underlying the
LMRA, which is the promotion of industrial peace through the
maintenance of stable bargaining relationships.19 In order to preserve
such stability at the bargaining table, the parties must know with
whom and for whom they are negotiating. For this reason the LMRA
designated the Board to decide the appropriate unit and agent, pre-
liminary to the actual bargaining, so as to eliminate any disruptive
uSection 9 sets out the procedure to be followed in determining proper repre-
sentation for employees and for proper certification of bargaining units. It provides:
SEC. 9 (a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate
for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the em-
ployees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect
to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of em-
ployment....
(b) The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to
employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this
Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be
the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof ....
(c) (i) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with
such regulations as may be prescribed by the Board... the Board shall in-
vestigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a ques-
tion of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an
appropriate hearing .... If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing
that such a question or representation exists, it shall direct an election by
secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964).
"'The policy as set forth in the LMRA is a simple but sweeping declaration
of purpose; namely, to eliminate the causes of obstructions to the free flow of com-
merce arising out of industrial strife. 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1964). One method of
accomplishing this result is to encourage collective bargaining. Thus stable and
effective bargaining, which is the underlying policy of the LMRA, is achieved.
Retail Associates, Inc., 10o N.L.R.B. 88, 393 (1958); In re Engineering Metal Prods.
Corp., 92 N.L.R.B. 823, 824 (195o.
1969]
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effect that might otherwise result if the question were left unresolved
or to the decision of the parties.20 The Board has jealously guarded
this statutory right and has steadfastly stated that it will not abdicate
this responsibility to the parties. 21 Thus an employer is under no obli-
gation to bargain with representatives of employees unless the unit
being represented has been found appropriate under established Board
procedure.2
2
Therefore, the question is whether the pooling together of several
independent bargaining units for the purpose of true coalition bargain-
ing represents an unauthorized expansion of the already existing
bargaining units so that the employer might lawfully refuse to bargain.
The answer to this question would appear to be yes.
When the coalition begins bargaining as a group, it will soon be-
come obvious that the coalition is not bargaining for each individually
certified unit, but for the combined units as a whole. Since these
combined units have not been certified as an appropriate unit under
section 9(b) and since -the coalition has not been certified as the ex-
clusive bargaining agent for the combined units, it is highly ques-
tionable whether the Board would require the employer to bargain
with the coalition.23
'See In re Waterfront Employers Ass'n, 71 N.L.R.B. 8o, io9-11 (1946).
=!d.
"See, e.g., Typographical Union, 123 N.L.R.B. 8o6 (1959), modified on other
grounds, 278 F.2d 6 (ist Cir. 196o), aff'd, 365 U.S. 705 (1961); cf. Electrical Workers
Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 1792 (1958), enforced per curiam, 266 F.2d 349 (5 th Cir. 1959).
2"Coalition bargaining finds another legal barrier when during negotiations
the union insists to the point of impasse that the company bargain with the coali-
tion rather than with each union individually. At that stage the employer may
refuse to bargain or may be compelled to bargain, depending on whether the size
of the bargaining unit is a mandatory or non-mandatory subject of bargaining.
29 U.S.C. § i58(d) (1964). Ever since NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp, 356 U.S. 342
(1958), it has been well settled that a party commits an unfair labor practice when
it bargains to impasse on a non-mandatory subject of bargaining. In Borg-Warner
the company was insisting upon a "recognition" clause in the contract which would
have the effect of eliminating the international union as the exclusive bargaining
agent for the employees. The international had been certified by the Board as the
exculsive bargaining agent. In holding that the Company was guilty of refusing to
bargain, the Court said that the subject herein involved was a non-mandatory
subject of bargaining and since the parties have a duty to bargain on all mandatory
subjects under section 8(d), insistence on agreement upon non-mandatory subjects
was a barrier to the performances of the parties' section 8(d) duties. And this consti-
tuted, indirectly to be sure, a refusal to bargain. See 29 U.S.C. § i58(a)(5) (1964).
In International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB, 277 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1960),
the Borg-Warner principle was applied directly to a union's attempt to unilater-
ally expand a certified bargaining unit. There the union had been certified to
represent employees in the Port of Greater New York and vicinity. During negotia-
tions the union insisted that the bargaining unit be extended to include almost all
[Vol. XXV1
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If the coalition of unions were able to convince the Board to
consider whether the coalition was an appropriate bargaining unit,
there would still be formidable barriers.2 4 First, the coalition would
have to overcome established precedent that a previous determination
of the appropriate bargaining unit in a Board representation proceed-
ing is binding in a subsequent proceeding charging an employer with
an unlawful refusal to bargain.25 Moreover, the coalition would have
to overcome the rule that individual local units are presumptively
appropriate unless there is affirmative evidence to the contrary.2 6 Thus,
for the coalition to prevail, it would have to show that a coalition made
up of several units is conclusively appropriate over an individual unit.
This could be a difficult undertaking. When the Board is determining
whether a single unit or a coalition of units is more appropriate, the
bargaining history of the parties is an important factor.27 In simplest
terms this means that the Board will look to see if the employer has
in the past bargained with the units in question on a single-unit or
multi-unit basis. If, for example, the parties in the past have mutually
consented to coalition bargaining or if the actions of the parties, as
manifested by their previous bargaining history, indicate a consent
to coalition bargaining, the Board is greatly influenced to find the
multi-unit appropriate.2 8 However, if the employer has always bargain-
ports from Maine to Texas. The employers filed a refusal-to-bargain charge. The
court held that the union had refused to bargain under the Borg-Warner theory.
Negotiating over the size of the bargaining unit is not a mandatory subject of
bargaining and insistence upon such discussion constitutes a refusal to bargain on
the mandatory subjects.
Thus, under Borg-Warner, negotiation on mandatory subjects of bargaining
would effectively be foreclosed if the unions insisted as a prerequisite to bargaining
on some non-mandatory item. And since, in view of Longshoremen's Ass/n, it would
be unlikely that a court would consider coalition bargaining a mandatory subject
for bargaining under section 8(d), it would appear that an unfair labor practice
would be committed by insistence upon it.
"The coalition, in order to get the Board to consider this question, would
normally have to file a petition under section 9(c) designating that they wish to
represent all employees who heretofore were being represented by the individual
unions in separate bargaining units. The Board would then, preliminary to an
actual election, have to determine whether this combination of heretofore separate
bargaining units could be appropriate as a single bargaining unit. See note 17
supra.
-See NLR.B v. Puritan Sportswear Corp., 385 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1967); Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 15o N.L.R.B. 1298 (1965); Wagner, Multi-Union Bargaining:
A Legal Analysis, 19 LAB. L.J. 733 (1968).
""Parsons Inv. Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 192 (1965); Fredrickson Motor Express Corp.,
12 1 N.L.R.B. 32 (1958); Shaver, 119 N.L.R.B. 939 (1957)-
17See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 1o3 N.L.R.B. 1749 (1953); American
Suppliers, Inc., 98 N.L.R.B. 692 (1952).
nCases cited note 27 supra.
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ed on a single-unit basis, a strong presumption arises that a workable
bargaining relationship exists, and the Board will be reluctant to order
any change.29 Since the establishment of a multi-unit bargaining his-
tory would initially depend upon the mutual consent of the parties,
it is unlikely that the factor of bargaining history would ever operate
in favor of unions which are trying to force a coalition upon the
employer.
There are other factors which the Board considers in determining
what is an appropriate bargaining unit.30 However, the bargaining
history of the parties seems to have special influence with the Board
and there is little doubt that when all other factors are either equal,
ambiguous, or otherwise non-decisive, the bagaining history of the
parties will be determinative. 31
Perhaps there is a more basic reason, grounded upon policy con-
siderations as to why the Board might not find a coalition an appropri-
ate bargaining unit. Either in its true form or in -the GE-IUE form,
legal coalition bargaining would have profound economic conse-
quences. "The ultimate goal of coordinated bargaining is to force com-
panies to negotiate major economic items on a national level."3 2 If
labor succeeds in its latest effort, one centralized bargaining commit-
tee could, through the use of strikes, control the stability of large
segments of the economy. As such, strikes would take on new propor-
tions in that they could have a critical impact on the national economy
to the extent that government would be compelled to intervene as a
protector of the public interest.3 3 When -this happens, the give and
take of true collective bargaining breaks down and is replaced by the
pressurized need for immediate settlement. Moreover, since unions
are not subject to the anti-trust laws,3 4 their concentration of power
would be virtually unchecked and would be conducive to great abuse.
"OThe reason for this probably reverts back to the underlying policy of the
LMRA-to maintain stable bargaining relationships. So, unless there has been a
complete breakdown, the Board will generally go with that arrangement which has
proven itself to be workable and thus stable. See note 19 supra.
"Included among these are geographic considerations, interchange of em-
ployees, integration of work and general community of interest among employees.
See Hall, The Appropriate Bargaining Unit, i8 W. Ras. L. REv. 479, 485 (1967).
"tGeneral Motors Co., 12o N.L.R.B. 1215 (1958).
22W. REUTHER, AGENDA FOR ToMoRROW 71 (1965) as quoted in Petitioner's Brief
on Review From Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board at 47,
General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, appeal docketed, No. 32867, 2d Cir., Feb. 28, 1969.
3See, e.g., Fleming, Emergency Strikes and National Policy, 1i LAB. L.J. 267
(1960).
"See Timbers, The Problems of Union Power and Antitrust Legislation, 16
LAB. LJ. 545 (1965).
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Although unions would be justified in seeking coalition bargaining
as a new weapon in their constant struggle against management, never-
theless, it would seem apparent that coalition bargaining would
operate against the public interest.
II
In order to avoid what seems to be inevitable legal pitfalls in uni-
laterally expanding their bargaining units or petitioning the Board
for certification as the appropriate bargaining unit, unions have
sought other techniques by which to achieve the same result.3 5 Thus,
in Standard Oil Co. v. NLRB36 and American Radiator and Standard
Sanitary Corp.37 unions met with some measure of success with the
technique of coordinated bargaining which was effected by having
"outsiders" sit in on the negotiations as members of a single union's
bargaining committee. In these cases the Board held that unions repre-
senting different units of the same employer have the right to agree
on a common set of bargaining objectives and to exchange representa-
tives to participate in each other's negotiations and otherwise co-
operate in an effort to achieve those objectives. The American Radia-
tor case is particularly relevant. In that case the union had previously
requested from the company its consent to use company-wide bargain-
ing in the upcoming negotiations. When the company refused, the
union merely made the members of the coalition members of their
own bargaining unit. At this point the unions, if they followed the pro-
cedure for coordinated bargaining outlined in Agenda for Tomor-
'ow,38 would have entered into an agreement whereby no union would
The unions themselves have recognized that true coalition bargaining presents
stubborn legal problems and thus have pursued the course of "coordinated bargain-
ing." See Lasser, Coordinated Bargaining: A Union Point of View, ig LAB. L.J. 512,
5 (1968).
"0322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963), enforcing 137 N.L.R.B. 69o (1962). In this case local
unions invited international representatives to sit in as members of their bargaining
committees. The unions involved here were all locals of the same international.
Coalition bargaining goes farther in that the "outsiders" are members of different
unions of different internationals. However, the Board used the same reasoning in
this case as it did in American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp, note 37 infra.
3155 N.L.R.B. 736 (1965), rev'd on other grounds, 381 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1967).
In reversing the Board's decision the Sixth Circuit said in effect that bargaining
under protest does not constitute a refusal to bargain under section 8(a)(5) and
thus dismissed the complaint on that basis. The court did not address itself to
the issue of whether the company was justified in initially refusing to meet with a
bargaining committee composed of "outsiders."
O'See Petitioner's Brief on Review From Decision and Order of the National
Labor Relations Board at 46, General Elec. Co. v. NLR.B, appeal docketed, No.
32867, 2d Cir., Feb. 28, 1969.
19691
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accept its contract until all sister unions in the coalition had been
offered similar terms.3 9 Charges were filed by the unions when the
company refused to bargain under these circumstances. The Board
held that a union had the right to select its own bargaining repre-
sentatives as well as the right to communicate and cooperate with
sister unions of the same employer. As such, the company could not
refuse to bargain because of the presence of the outsiders.
4 0
This case is significant because the union by merely selecting its
own representatives -to sit on its bargaining committee, was able to
accomplish the same result as it would have under true coalition
bargaining-without having to face the legal questions which enshroud
that technique. Thus, in American Radiator the Board allowed the
union to accomplish indirectly what it most likely could not have
accomplished directly. The Board's reasoning in American Radiator
was never tested by the courts, as the Sixth Circuit reversed on other
grounds.41 The General Electric case, which is not unlike American
Radiator, provided the Board an opportunity to re-evaluate its decision
in American Radiator. Unfortunately, the Board chose ,to confine itself
only to the problems of whether the company could refuse to bargain
Id.
'However, the Board has carved out important exceptions to this holding.
Where the presence of outsiders or any other member of the bargaining committee
causes such disruption, confusion, or mistrust to be present at the bargaining table
so that effective, good faith bargaining cannot be effected, then the Board will gen-
erally relieve the other party from its duty to bargain. Thus in NLRB v. Kentucky
Util. Co. 182 F.2d 8io (6th Cir. 195o), the court held that where a union repre-
sentative had shown such open hostility toward the company and its negotiating
team that good faith bargaining was rendered impossible, the company could law-
fully refuse to bargain. The negotiator involved 'had been fired by the company
and subsequently became a union representative. Prior to negotiations he told how
he would "get even with the company" and "hoped they might go broke." The
court noted how such an attitude could only create mistrust in the minds of the
company negotiators and where mistrust exists, only "lip service" bargaining can
result. The policy underlying the LMRA did not contemplate that the negotiators
would have to overcome such obstacles.
Another case where the right of the parties to select their bargaining repre-
sentatives and the overriding policy underpinning collective bargaining came into
conflict was NLRB v. International Ladies' Garment Workers, 274 F.2d 376 (3d
Cir. 196o). There an ex-union negotiator "showed up" on the company's bargaining
team to negotiate for the company against his old union. Obviously, the ex-union
negotiator had a considerable amount of inside knowledge about the union and its
bargaining tactics and the company made it clear that it had "put one over on the
union." The court held that the union was under no duty to bargain with this
company committee where it appeared obvious that no substantive bargaining
progress could be made. Surface bargaining is not conducive to accomplishing the
underlying goals of the LMRA, namely, good faith bargaining. See General Elec.
Co., 173 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 69 L.R.R.M. 130 5 , 1307 (1968).41See note 37 supra.
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solely because of the "outsiders" on the union committee. Thus, the
General Electric case will likely provide the first clear test by the
courts of the Board's reasoning in these cases.
The distinction which the Board seemingly draws between coali-
tion and coordinated bargaining is perhaps more one of form than of
substance, for the addition of other union representatives to one
union's bargaining committee still raises objections which are com-
mon to a direct attempt at coalition bargaining. When the employer
takes note of the presence of the other union representatives in one
union's bargaining session, he can never be sure who the union is
truly representing-its own unit or an interlocking coalition. His
suspicion is particularly magnified in view of the fact that he knows
that the very unions who are now sitting as representatives of one
union desired coalition bargaining and that they had been previously
denied a request to bargain in a coalition relative to these negotia-
tions. Though the union would contend that the outside unions are
there bargaining only for the one union, it is virtually impossible for
the outside unions to separate their ultimate goals and problems from
those of the unit for whom they purport to be bargaining.42 Irre-
spective of the union's true intent, an atmosphere of suspicion and
mistrust may immediately arise. Such an atmosphere is conducive to
"sham" or "surface" bargaining since the parties are likely to go
only through the motions of bargaining while attempting to gather
further evidence as to what their bargaining adversary is trying to
accomplish. Under such circumstances bargaining stability would
inevitably deteriorate, thus causing the very situation which the Board
is charged to prevent.
Upon closer analysis the union's reasons for wanting other union
representatives are not persuasive. The outsiders in both General
Electric and American Radiator were secondary to the negotiations
and could have been easily removed without serious effect upon the
union's bargaining ability. Thus, if the very presence of the outsiders
created bargaining unrest because management felt the unions were
trying to come in through the back door in an effort to bargain in a
coalition, the policy of the LMRA would best be fulfilled by removing
the outsiders rather than ordering the company to bargain in an
atmosphere of sham and mistrust caused by the outsiders' presence.
Moreover, if the union's reasons for having the other unions sit in
'2See General Elec. Co. 173 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 69 L.R.R.M. 13o5, 1312 (968)
(dissenting opinion).
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